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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE 
COMPANY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 1 









i No. 13843 
Amicus-Curiae. j 
AMICUS CURIAE BRI EF 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
These are consolidated cases arising on petitions 
for review by this Court of a decision of the State Tax 
Commission assessing additional corporation franchise 
taxes. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N O F T H E CASES 
I N T H E T A X COMMISSION 
The Tax Commission's Decision No. 288 partially 
disallowed deductions for federal income taxes taken 
by Midland Telephone Company and Utah Telephone 
Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "tax-
payers") in the computation of Utah corporation fran-
chise taxes. 
The prior hearing of this matter was before an 
administrative commission, under its own rules, which 
commission is the defendant in this proceeding. Mem-
bers of the commission who ruled upon these taxpayers' 
plea also took part in establishing commission assess-
ment policies. This case is not an appeal from a lower 
court decision, and there has been no previous judicial 
determination based on the legal merits. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T 
Amicus-Curiae submits that the Court should re-
verse the administrative decision of the Tax Commis-
sion and hold the deductions taken by the taxpayers to 
be proper. 
P U R P O S E O F AMICUS C U R I A E B R I E F 
The major thrust of this amicus brief will be to 
demonstrate that the brief prepared for the Tax Com-
2 
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mission by the Attorney General relies to a large de-
gree on artificial concepts and arguments which have 
nothing to do with the legal issues before the Court. 
The brief ignores fundamental principals, clouds the 
issues by injecting irrelevant and complicated tax 
criteria, asks this Court to create inequities among and 
discriminate against certain Utah taxpayers, and con-
stitutes an effort to vest vast legislative powers in the 
Tax Commission. 
Amicus' special interest in this case arises because 
as a Utah corporation, it files a federal consolidated 
return with other out-of-state banking corporations but 
does not enjoy the privilege (under U.C.A. §59-13-
23(1) (1953) which requires 95% ownership by one 
entity) of filing a Utah consolidated return. Because 
it must file a separate Utah return, Amicus finds it-
self in a position substantially similar to that of Con-
tinental Telephone. I t may be assumed that there are 
numerous other Utah taxpayers which must follow the 
same tax return procedure. Because of the importance 
of this case, not only to Continental Telephone, but 
also to other Utah taxpayers not represented before 
the Court, Walker Bank has petitioned to enter as 
Amicus Curiae. 
Beyond the technical substantive issues raised by 
this case, Amicus wishes to protest before the Court 
what may be a new approach of the Tax Commission 
to assessments against all taxpayers. Amicus believes 
3 
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the Tax Commission, in this case, has asked the Court 
to give its approval to a system of assessment which is 
not grounded upon specific authorization by the Leg-
islature and which relies upon executive branch crea-
tion of new tax law by applying phrases and sentences 
taken out of context to situations far from those con-
sidered by the Legislature. 
More dangerous, however, is the introduction of 
the boldly expressed theory that it is appropriate to 
introduce new interpretations and discriminations be-
tween taxpayers if such will increase revenues. (Tax 
Commission's Finding of Fact 11 14 (R. 15) cited in 
Tax Commission's brief, p. 14). 
C O L L A T E R A L C O N S I D E R A T I O N S 
This case gives rise to issues not here argued, re-
lating to the sanctity of contracts and inequities which 
may be foisted upon minority stockholders as a result 
of adherence to a contractual duty without receipt of a 
correlating contractual right. For example, under cir-
cumstances similar to these cases, a subsidiary with min-
ority stockholders may enter into a contract with a 
parent company after arms length negotiations. The 
contract could contain a variety of terms and conditions 
giving rise to rights and duties, privileges and liabil-
ities and may include an agreement to file a consoli-
4 
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dated return. If the Utah company and its minority 
stockholders are to obtain the fruits of the bargain 
with the parent company, the Utah company must 
have equal treatment under Utah law with other Utah 
taxpayers. The equities involved may give rise to a 
legal issue, under Utah tax laws, that the payment, by 
a subsidiary to the parent, of a separately determined 
federal tax pursuant to contract may be an "ordinary 
and necessary business expense" within the meaning of 
the Utah tax law. This is an issue which requires con-
siderable elaboration and discussion, but which has not 
been raised and briefed by the parties to this case. 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, as Amicus Curiae, 
does not expect the issue to be resolved in the present 
litigation, but nonetheless asks the Court to recognize 
that an in-depth briefing and argument of the "ordin-
ary and necessary business expense" issue could result 
in a decision in favor of the taxpayer, even if the Court 
were to hold against the taxpayer on all other issues. 
Hence, we urge the Court to withhold making any 
ruling which might include that issue until such time 
as the question can be fully presented. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Amicus-Curiae believes there is one central fact 
which is not adequately disclosed in either brief. The 
Tax Commission's disallowance of taxpayers' federal 
tax deduction for payments actually made imposes 
5 
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higher state tax costs upon them than are made by 
Utah corporations similarly situated but which do not 
file federal consolidated returns. 
I t is important that at no point in its brief does 
the Attorney General dispute the fact that the amount 
sought to be disallowed would be deductible if there 
were no federal consolidated return filed since the 
exact same amount would be paid directly to the In-
ternal Revenue Service. 
Under the method employed by the taxpayers to 
determine their deduction for "taxes paid", they first 
determine their federal tax liability on a separate return 
basis. That is, each subsidiary determines what its own 
federal tax liability would be if it filed a separate rather 
than consolidated federal income tax return. This 
amount is then paid to Continental, the stockholder, 
under a binding federal consolidated return election, 
and taken as a deduction on the taxpayers' Utah fran-
chise tax return. Continental, in turn, pays the federal 
consolidated tax liability. There is no "recomputed" 
tax calculation, and there is no question but that the 
actual payment of the full amount computed has been 
made by actual cash transfer out of the state and out 
of the Utah taxpayers' corporate funds every year. 
Amicus-Curiae adopts the reference notations used 
by the Attorney General on p. 1 of his brief, but adopts 
the Statement of Facts as set forth in plaintiff's brief, 
6 
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with the exception of plaintiff's description on p. 6 of 
its brief, of the deduction computation which the Tax 
Commission alleges is proper. 
The alleged appropriate computation would partly 
disallow the federal tax deduction taken by reducing 
the deduction to the amount which bears the same ratio 
to the total consolidated federal tax paid by Continental 
which the taxpayers' net income bears to the net in-
come of all profitable subsidiaries combined. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
P A Y M E N T S C A L C U L A T E D ACCORDING 
TO F E D E R A L L A W U N D E R A B I N D I N G 
E L E C T I O N TO F I L E A FEDERAL CON-
S O L I D A T E D R E T U R N A R E D E D U C T -
I B L E AS T A X E S P A I D " . 
(A) The Plain Meaning of "Taxes Paid" in 
U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953) Includes the Pay-
ments by the Taxpayers to Continental. 
As described in the Statement of Material Facts 
in this Brief (p. 5), and in the Statement of Facts in 
the taxpayers' brief, the taxpayers in this case deducted 
only their Federal taxes, computed in the same manner 
as every other Utah corporation computes its taxes. 
7 
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They actually paid out those same computed amounts 
from corporate funds and the payment was reviewed 
by utility regulatory bodies which completely control 
the rate of profit they are allowed to make. 
The Attorney General is not here challenging any 
"loophole" or "gimmick" deduction, nor any inflated 
expense. He is not challenging any hiding of income 
or step-transaction intended to avoid recognition of 
gain. The entire question here briefed hinges upon one 
fact: Instead of making a check out to the Internal 
Revenue Service, the taxpayers, following Federal reg-
ulations, made their payment of federal taxes to their 
controlling shareholder and agent, Continental Tele-
phone. 
Under federal regulations, the taxpayers, who had 
elected to join in a federal consolidated return, could 
not deal directly with the Internal Revenue Service 
with respect to payment of their federal taxes. Treas. 
Reg. §1.1502-77 (a). They were required to deal through 
their agent,1 which had the responsibility of satisfying 
the taxpayers' liability to the government in Washing-
ton.2 The taxpayers were thus making a payment to 
the government through their agent. Continental. 
i For purposes of the federal consolidated return, the parent is 
made the agent of all subsidiaries. Treas. Reg. §1.1502-77(a). 
2 Until the tax liability of the entire consolidated group has 
been satisfied through payment by the agent, Continental and 
each member of the group is liable for the entire tax due. 
Therefore, until full payment was made by Continental, tax-
payers had a federal tax liability which could far exceed their 
individual computed liability. Treas. Reg. §1.1502-6(a). 
8 
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The basic question to be answered is: Are pay-
ments, (1) which are actually made, (2) which are 
computed according to the federal tax formula all 
Utah corporations use, and (3) which are paid to the 
taxpayers' "agent" under federal tax regulations (a 
separate, distinct corporation which has primary re-
sponsibility to satisfy taxpayers' federal tax liability), 
to be treated the same as "taxes paid" by all other Utah 
corporations? 
The Utah statute which the Attorney General ad-
mits allows a federal "taxes paid" deduction to other 
Utah corporations, reads as follows: 
"59-13-7. Deductions from gross income.—In 
computing net income there shall be allowed as 
deductions: 
Taxes Paid. 
(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable 
year, except —" 
(The listed exceptions are not at issue in this 
case.) 
The term "taxes" is not defined in the Code. However, 
the phrase "paid or accrued" is defined in U.C.A. §59-
13-1(7) as follows: 
"(7) The terms . . . "paid or accrued" shall 
be construed according to the method of account-
ing upon the basis of which the net income is 
computed." 
The taxpayers' method of accounting, dictated by 
9 
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regulatory bodies, has consistently recognized and ac-
crued federal tax liabilities and federal tax payments 
determined on a separate return basis. Upon payment 
of the computed taxes,, the corporations suffered an 
economic "tax" through the loss of the funds so trans-
ferred. 
Two midwest states (see below), faced with the 
same question now before this Court, have looked di-
rectly at the statute, and agreed that the payments in-
volved here are "taxes paid". 
(B) Recent Kansas and Iowa Decisions have 
Held that Payments made Under Circumstances 
Substantially Identical to Those in this Case 
should be Considered "Taxes Paid", and a De-
luction Allowed Therefor on the State Taw Re-
turn. 
(1) The Cities Service Case Fact Situ-
ation. 
The taxpayers' brief discusses the similar Kansas 
cases of Cities Service Gas Co. v. McDonald, 204 Kan. 
705, 466 P.2d 277 (1970) and Northern Natural Gas 
Processing Co. v. McCoy, 197 Kan. 740, 421 P.2d 190 
(1967), on pp. 8, 9, and 10 of its brief. The Attorney 
General's brief attempts to distinguish the Cities Serv-
ice case on pages 21 and 22 with what Amicus believes 
to be an erroneous reading of the case and a novel and 
completely non-legal view of the actions of the Kansas 
10 
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Legislature. The Attorney General did not respond 
to the Iowa case. 
Because the facts of Cities Service are not accur-
ately set out in the briefs, they are restated here. The 
taxpayer was a wholly-owned subsidiary which filed a 
federal consolidated return with the other members of 
an affiliated group. Cities Service took a deduction on 
its Kansas state return for federal taxes paid in an 
amount equal to what its federal tax liability would 
have been had it filed its federal return on a separate 
rather than consolidated basis. Cities Service paid that 
amount over to its parent corporation. For the year in 
question, the taxpayer had a separately determined 
federal tax liability of $6,367,534 while the consoli-
dated return showed an operating loss and no federal 
taxes paid. The refund to the parent which resulted 
from a carryback of the consolidated loss, and the pay-
ments received by the parent from the profit subsid-
iaries were paid over to the loss subsidiaries as compen-
sation for the consolidated use of those losses. 
(2) The Cities Service Holding. 
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the conclusion 
of the district court that no gain resulted to the parent 
corporation from the payments in question, and that the 
subsidiary could fully deduct the payment. The Court 
added that: 
The district court, in its memorandum decision, 
11 
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found that as a result of the accounting proced-
ure utilized in this case, no gain resulted to the 
parent, . . . from [subsidiary's] payment of $6,-
367,534, and [the subsidiary] was poorer to the 
extent of its liability in that amount. Further-
more, there was no tax saving to [the subsidiary] 
because of its taxable income and the tax thereon 
having been reported on the consolidated return. 
The court concluded that [the sudsidiary] did in-
cur, and pay, federal income tax for the year 
1958 in the amount of $6,367,534, and that the 
director's disallowance of [the subsidiary's] 
claimed deduction was erroneous. Cities Service> 
supra at 709. 
In order to avoid dealing with the real holding of 
Cities Service, the Attorney General set up a "straw-
man": 
"Apparently, the Kansas case relied upon the 
. reasoning thai; there was not tax savings to either 
the parent or the subsidiary company as a result 
of being included in the consolidated return. (At 
page 283) Respondent has previously shown 
substantial tax savings to the parent and subsid-
iaries." (Tax Commission's brief at p. 21). 
The Kansas Court did not hold, as the Attorney 
General would have this Court believe, that there were 
no benefits to be derived from filing the consolidated 
return. There were, of course, benefits to the loss sub-
sidiaries. The Court merely stated that there was no 
benefit to the profit subsidiary, just as there is no 
economic benefit to the taxpayers in this case. The 
Kansas Court felt that this was an added factor weigh-
ing in favor of the taxpayer's position. 
12 
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Page 22 of the Attorney General's brief states 
that Cities Service has been ' 'overruled" since the Kan-
sas Legislature repealed the statute allowing any corp-
oration, whether or not part of an affiliated group, any 
deduction of federal taxes whatsoever. Notwithstand-
ing the change in the underlying statute, the reasoning 
of Kansas' Court in dealing with the statute before it 
is still of value in construing a similar Utah statute. 
The Attorney General does, however, make a valu-
able point: If the federal tax deduction is to be nar-
owed, specially defined or otherwise modified or elim-
inated, it should be left to the Utah Legislature to do 
so, just as the Kansas Court deferred the same ques-
tion to a subsequent Kansas Legislature. 
(3) Comparison of Controlling Kansas 
Statute with U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953). 
Neither brief sets out and directly compares the 
controlling statutes involved. 
In Kansas, General Statutes 1957 Supp. 79-3206 
(a) (3) allows a deduction for federal income taxes 
"paid" during the year. General Statutes 1949, 79-
3202 defining "paid" reads: 
"(8) The word "paid" means 'paid or incur-
red' or 'paid or accrued' and shall be construed 
in accordance with the method of accounting 
used as a basis for computing net income under 
this act." 
13 
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The Court construed "paid" to mean the taxpayer was 
authorized to deduct its entire federal income tax liabil-
ity computed on a separate return basis and actually 
paid to its parent despite the fact that no consolidated 
tax was paid by the parent with its return. Cities Serv-
ice Gas Co. v. McDonald, supra at 712. 
In Utah, U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953) allows the 
deduction on the state franchise tax return for "taxes 
paid or accrued." U.C.A. § 59-13-1(7) (1953) defines 
"paid or accrued": 
The terms "paid or incurred" and "paid or 
accrued" shall be construed according to the 
method of accounting upon the basis of which 
the net income is computed. 
The statutory provision in Utah defining "taxes paid" 
is substantially identical to the Kansas statute. In ad-
dition, the method of accounting used by Midland and 
Utah Telephone to determine their net income included 
a deduction for federal taxes computed on a separate 
return basis in the same manner as did the taxpayer 
in Cities Service. The Kansas Supreme Court held that 
the payment in question amounted to a payment of 
federal taxes, and allowed the deduction. 
(4) The Massey-Ferguson Case Fol-
lows Cities Service. 
A very recent decision by the State Board of Tax 
Review of Iowa follows the holding of the Kansas Su-
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preme Court in Cities Service. See, Massey-Ferguson 
Credit Corp. v. Briggs, Decision No. 48 of State Board 
of Tax Review of Iowa (July 8, 1974).3 This case is 
dealt with by the taxpayers on p. 9 of their brief. How-
ever, the Attorney General made no mention of it in his 
brief. 
In Massey, a federal consolidated return was filed. 
The taxpayer was a subsidiary which joined in the fed-
eral return, made payments to its parent equal to its 
separately determined tax liability, and took a deduc-
tion for one-half that amount on its state tax return 
(the Iowa statute allows a deduction for one-half the 
"taxes paid"). The Iowa Board of Tax Review spec-
ifically followed Cities Service and allowed the deduc-
tion in full even though no consolidated tax was paid 
on the federal consolidated return. 
(5) The Trunkline Case, Relied Upon 
by the Attorney General, is Distinguished 
by the Cities Service Case. 
The state argued in Cities Service 4 that Trunkline 
Gas Company v. Collector of Revenue (La.App. 
1965), 182 S.2d 674, which on its face is factually sim-
ilar, should be used as a precedent to disallow the de-
3 See Appendix p. iii for the text of this Decision. 
4 The Attorney General makes the same argument on page 22 of 
his brief. The taxpayers discuss the case at page 10 of their 
brief. 
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duction. The Louisiana statute relevant to the deduc-
tion in Trunkline provides that: 
. . . The amount of federal income taxes to be 
so deducted shall be that portion of the total 
federal income tax which is levied with respect 
to the particular income derived from sources in 
this state to be computed in accordance with 
rules and regulations of the collector of revenue 
. . . R.S. 47:241. (Emphasis added) 
Pursuant to the authority specifically granted by the 
statute, the state promulgated a regulaion which pro-
vided, in part, that: 
Where a corporation includes its net income 
in a consolidated federal income tax return, the 
portion of the total consolidated tax attributable 
to such corporation shall be determined by allo-
cating the tax of the consolidated group to the 
several members of the group on the basis of the 
percentage of the total tax which the tax of such 
member, as computed on a separate return, would 
bear to the total amount of taxes for all members 
of the group so computed.. . . I T R 55.2. 
The Kansas Supreme Court refused to follow 
Trunkline. The Court's refusal was based on the fact 
that Louisiana had a regulation directly in point, while 
Kansas did not, and the Kansas Legislature had never 
authorized the promulgation of such a regulation. 
(6) The Cities Service Distinction of 
Trunkline also applies in this Case. 
16 
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The Attorney General cites the Trunkline case as 
the authority to be followed in Utah. He maintains 
that Regulation 13 is similar to the Louisiana regula-
tion with respect to the "taxes paid" deduction. I t ap-
pears to be the Attorney General's position that the 
mere existence of Regulation 13 distinguishes the Cities 
Service case. 
The Attorney General's brief is misleading when 
it says (emphasis added): 
"[Trunkline's parent did not pay] Federal in-
come taxes within the contemplation and intent-
ment of LSA-RS 47:55 and 47:241, as to entitle 
the Trunkline Gas Company to full credit de-
duction of the Federal income tax attributable 
to Louisiana derived income, which it computes 
to be due the Federal Government as though it 
were paying this tax on the basis of a separate 
tax return. (At page 679) Apparently, the 
Louisiana Court based its decision on the statute 
requiring payment in fact. It should be noted 
that the statute providing for the deduction of 
Federal taxes in Louisiana is the same, word-for-
word, as the statute in question in Utah. (See 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-13-7(3) 
(1953)) (Tax Commission's brief, p. 22). 
The Attorney General's statement is based on a 
half-truth. The statutes providing for full deduction 
are, indeed, the same. 
"L.S.A.-R.S. 47:55. Deductions from gross 
income; taxes generally. 
17 
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"In computing net income, there shall be allowed 
as deductions all taxes paid or accrued within 
the taxable year except: [The excepts have no 
application to this case.]" 
(See, Trunkline, supra at 677) 
"U.C.A. 59-13-7. Deductions from gross in-
come.—In computing net income there shall be 
allowed as deductions: . . . 
Taxes Paid 
(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable 
year, except— . . . " 
However, the "statute in question" in Utah is 
§ 59-13-1(7) (quoted on p. 9) while the "statute in 
question" in Louisiana was R. S. 47:241. They are 
completely dissimilar in that they define entirely dif-
ferent terms, and more to the point, Louisiana grants 
specific regulatory authority while Utah does not. The 
Louisiana statute provides: 
"L.S.A.-R.S. 47:241. Net income subject to 
tax. 
"The net income of a nonresident individual 
or foreign corporation subject to the tax imposed 
by this Chapter shall be the sum of the net allo-
cable income earned within or derived from 
sources within this state, as defined in R.S. 47: 
243, and the net apportionable income derived 
from sources in this state, as defined in R.S. 47: 
244, less the amount of federal income taxes at-
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tributable to the net allocable income and net 
apportionable income derived from sources in 
this state. The amount of federal income taxes 
to be so deducted shall be that portion of the total 
federal income tax which is levied with respect 
to the particular income derived from sources in 
this state to be computed in accordance with rules 
and regulations of the collector of revenue. 
(See, Trunkline, supra at 677). (Emphasis 
added) 
The Utah and Kansas statutes are substantially 
identical both in allowing the deduction for taxes paid, 
and in their definition of "paid or accrued." Neither 
Kansas nor Utah authorizes the promulgation of regu-
lations dealing specifically with the deduction of fed-
eral taxes paid. See U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953). On 
the other hand, Louisiana specifically authorizes such 
regulations. Considering the similarity of the Kansas 
and Utah statutes and the dissimilarity of the Utah 
and Louisiana statutes, it is submitted that, unless the 
Tax Commission can establish a specific legislative 
grant of regulatory authority (discussed in this brief 
beginning at p. 27), it cannot logically be maintained 
that our Utah statute, § 59-13-7(3), requires disallow-
ance of taxpayers' deductions. I t is, therefore, appro-
priate for the Utah Court to follow the Kansas case 
rather than the Louisiana case and hold that the tax-
payers' payments to Continental were, in fact, "taxes 
paid." 
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POINT II 
T H E ATTORNEY GENERAL H A S MIS-
CONSTRUED T H E F E D E R A L REGULA-
TIONS D E A L I N G W I T H CONSOLI-
D A T E D RETURNS. 
The Attorney General, at p. 19 of his brief, has 
made certain representations as to how the federal con-
solidated return regulations work. Unfortunately, he 
has misconstrued these regulations to the end that 
erroneous prejudicial concepts are interjected. 
The first full paragraph on p. 19 of the Attorney 
General's brief deals with the payments made by profit 
subsidiaries to loss subsidiaries to compensate the latter 
for the use of their losses. The first sentence of that 
paragraph says "likewise, taxes are reduced by mov-
ing in and out of different percentage tax brackets, in 
general/' This implies that a consolidated group can 
reduce its federal taxes by these payments. This is 
simply not true. There is no moving in and out of dif-
ferent tax brackets. There is only one tax bracket, and 
that is applied to the consolidated taxable income. Any 
shifting of funds between subsidiaries does not change 
the consolidated taxable income, and therefore, has 
nothing to do with determining how much federal tax 
the affiliated group pays. 
In a similar erroneous and irrelevant claim, the 
second paragraph on p. 19 of the Attorney General's 
brief states in part that: 
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The Treasury Department has provided that 
corporations qualifying under Regulation Sec-
tion 1.1502-33(d) (2) may treat these tax-com-
pensating payments as a deductible tax payment, 
both to the profit member making the payment 
and to the loss member receiving it. The result-
ing tax effect is obvious. (Emphasis added) 
If anything is obvious, it is that Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
33(d) has nothing to do with "taxes paid." The only 
relevance of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33 (d) is to illustrate 
that the method used by the taxpayers is an accepted 
method of accounting. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-33 pertains to "Earnings and 
Profits" (as opposed to "net taxable income"). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has found the "earnings and prof-
its" concept (here dealt with in Treas. Reg. §1.1502-33 
(d) (2)) a good deal less than obvious: 
"earnings and profits' in the tax sense, . . . 
does not correspond exactly to taxable income 
[and] does not necessarily follow corporate ac-
counting concepts." 5 
The earnings and profits concept is primarily in-
tended to serve as an aid in the definition of the income 
of shareholders of a corporation. Thus, its role is to 
serve as an aid in ascertaining the extent of the pool 
of funds, in excess of the invested capital of the corp-
oration, that is available for distribution to the share-
holders of the corporation. Hence, the concept serves 
5 Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542, 546 (1945). 
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to differentiate those corporate distributions which rep-
resent gains on invested capital, which should be tax-
able, from those that represent a nontaxable return of 
capital. 
Every corporation must maintain an earnings and 
profits account in order to determine the amount of any 
distribution which is to be taxed as a dividend under 
LR.C. §316(a). The earnings and profits account of 
a corporation is reduced by federal income taxes ac-
crued or paid. Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Tax-
ation of Corporations and Shareholders (3d Ed. 1971) 
at 7-18. Reducing the earnings and profits account re-
duces income which is potentially taxable to a share-
holder as a dividend. Therefore, it is necessary to have 
rules on how to allocate this reduction when only one tax 
is paid by a consolidated group. This is the problem 
dealt with by Treas. Reg. §1.1502-33 (d). That regula-
tion does not allow a deduction from gross income for 
these compensating payments. Therefore, the tax effect 
of this federal regulation is not obvious. In fact, it has 
absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the amount 
of federal income tax which is paid by a consolidated 
group. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E D E C I S I O N O F T H E T A X COMMIS-
SION IS E R R O N E O U S I N S O F A R AS I T IS 
B A S E D U P O N U.C.A. SECTION 59-13-17. 
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The Tax Commission states in Conclusion of Law 
No. 2 (R. 16): 
Utah Code Annotated 59-13-17, which provides 
that in any case of two or more corporations 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the 
same interest, the Utah State Tax Commission 
is authorized to distribute, apportion or allocate 
gross income or deductions between and among 
such corporations, if it determines that such dis-
tribution, apportionment or allocation is neces-
sary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or 
clearly to reflect the income of any such corpor-
ations. 
As partial justification for the attempted applica-
tion of §59-13-17, the Attorney General, in his brief 
at p. 14,6 states ". . . that the failure to apply the Utah 
State Corporate Franchise Tax Regulation, No. 13, 
would cost the State of Utah revenue. . . ." Certainly 
the fact that the State of Utah will gain or lose revenue 
is not pertinent to the correct application of §59-13-17. 
The correct application of §59-13-17 can only be deter-
mined by an analysis of the section itself. 
The Tax Commission is attempting to use §59-13-17 
to disallow part of the deductions taken by Midland and 
Utah Telephone. This is a misuse of the section. Sec-
tion 59-13-17 authorizes the Tax Commission to ". . . 
distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or de-
6 The misapplication of §59-13-17 is discussed in taxpayers brief 
beginning at p. 16. 
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ductions . . .," but it does not authorize the Tax Com-
mission to disallow a deduction, in whole or in part. 
The absence of the word "disallow" from § 59-13-17 is 
not merely a matter of semantics. 
Section 59-13-17 is taken almost word for word 
from § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. The only 
changes in § 59-13-17 are those necessary to convert 
it from a federal to a state statute. The substance of 
the provision remains the same as § 482. Bittker & 
Eustice in their work on corporate taxation state that: 
. . . the Commissioner's powers under § 482 only 
permit the reallocation of incomes or deductions 
among various members of the affiliated group, 
the section cannot be used to disallow deduc-
tionsj and in this respect is narrower than § 269. 
Bittker & Eustice, supra at 15-22. (second em-
phasis added) 
In dealing with the proper use of § 482, Bittker & 
Eustice go on to state that: 
One of the principal features of the regulations 
is the correlative adjustment procedure of Regs. 
§ 1.482-1 (d) (2). By requiring an appropriate 
correlative adjustment to be made on behalf of 
other members of the group who are affected by 
the primary adjustment under § 482, the regu-
lations emphasize the fact that § 482 is an alloca-
tion section, rather than a disallowance provision. 
For example, if income is reallocated from sub-
sidiary X to subsidiary Y under § 482, the in-
come of X must be decreased to take account of 
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the fact that the income has been attributed to 
Y. Id. at 15-30. 
The above citation from Bittker & Eustice points 
up the proper use of §§482 and 59-13-17. Those sec-
tions assume that a total deduction figure has already 
been arrived at (e.g., the amount of a federal "taxes 
paid" deduction), and that the only question remaining 
is how much of the total deduction each subsidiary 
should get. 
To illustrate the proper use of §59-13-17 consider 
the following example: 
A and B are wholly owned subsidiaries of X and 
all three corporations join in filing a federal con-
solidated return. A is profitable, but B operates 
at a loss. B has an asset which it has fully de-
preciated, and which could be used in A's busi-
ness. The fair market value of the asset is $100,-
000. B sells this asset to A for $200,000. 
The sale is made because, although B will have 
a large gain on the sale, it will have no taxable income 
(and therefore no tax) because it has been operating 
at a loss. On the other hand, A will have a higher basis 
in the asset which it can depreciate. The net effect is 
that A will be able to shelter more tax dollars, because 
of the higher depreciation costs, but there will be no 
cost to the group because of B's financial position. 
This example is a proper situation for the applica-
tion of §59-13-17. Under that section, it would be ap-
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propriate for the Tax Commission to allow A to de-
preciate the asset on a $100,000 basis only. As a cor-
responding adjustment, the Tax Commission would re-
duce the gain attributable to B by $100,000. To apply 
the section properly, there must be this corresponding 
adjustment. 
In the present case, the Tax Commission is not 
seeking to make an adjustment. What the Tax Com-
mission seeks to do is to entirely disallow part of a de-
duction. Under the application sought by the Tax 
Commission, there would be no corresponding adjust-
ment for any other subsidiary. No other susidiary of 
Continental would be a,ble to eliminate from its income 
the amount of the deduction disallowed the taxpayers. 
Such a use of §59-13-17 is not proper, and should not 
be permitted by the Court. The substantive determin-
ation of what the "taxes paid" deduction is should be 
left to the provisions specifically dealing therewith. 
Section 59-13-17 should be left for the situation where 
the allocation of an already determined deduction is 
being improperly manipulated. 
As has been shown repeatedly throughout this brief, 
there is no distortion of income and there is no evasion 
of taxes whatsoever. There is therefore no basis on 
which to consider use of §59-13-17. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E T A X C O M M I S S I O N S A P P L I C A T I O N 
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OF R E G U L A T I O N 13 TO T H E S E TAX-
P A Y E R S IS I N ERROR. 
(A) No General Authority to Regulate is 
Given by the State Constitution. 
The Attorney General's citation of the Constitu-
tion on p. 7 of his brief, by the words quoted, only gives 
power to "administer and supervise" laws, not interpret 
or issue regulations. 
(B) The Tax Commission Has No Author-
ity Under U.C.A. §59-5-46 To Promulgate 
Franchise Tax Regulations. 
U.C.A. §59-5-46 (1953), according to the Attorney 
General in his brief at page 8, is a general source of 
power for the promulgation of Regulation 13. How-
ever, by citing this section as authority for Regulation 
13, the Attorney General proposes to give the Tax 
Commission unlimited regulatory authority far beyond 
that given by the Legislature and never approved by 
this Court. 
The title of U.C.A. §59-5-46 (1953) is "General 
Powers and Duties." That code section was enacted 
under Chapter 5 of Title 59. Chapter 5 of Title 59 
is entitled "Assessment of Property", and deals gen-
erally with the assessment of property. Chapter 13, on 
the other hand, is the chapter wherein the powers of 
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the Tax Commission with respect to the franchise tax 
are contained. 
The relevant statutory scheme is made clear by 
reference to Exhibits "A" and "B".7 Exhibit "A" 
shows the general listing of the chapters included under 
Title 59, "Revenue and Taxation." Section 59-5-46 
(1953) is subsumed under the title "Assessment of 
Property." I t seems more than strange that such broad 
regulatory power over the franchise tax would be placed 
in an obscure section dealing with the assessment of the 
property tax. 
Exhibit "B" , the first page of Chapter 5, shows 
that the chapter clearly is concerned with the specific 
area of property assessment and the Tax Commission's 
role in property assessment, not corporate franchise 
taxes, nor general, all-encompassing regulatory grants. 
In addition, the Attorney General's contention that 
U.C.A. §59-5-46 (1953) gives the Tax Commission the 
power to promulgate corporate franchise tax regula-
tions does not comport with a proper construction of 
that section. Each subsection in U.C.A. §59-5-46 
(1953) deals with some aspect of the assessment of the 
property tax and the powers of the Tax Commission 
with respect thereto. The purpose of the section was 
to detail the powers and duties of the Tax Commission 
with respect to the property tax. Section 59-5-46 has 
7 Appendix, pp. i and ii. 
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nothing to do with the corporate franchise tax which 
is separately treated in Chapter 13 of Title 59. 
I t seems clear that the Attorney General's claim 
for the Tax Commission of general regulatory author-
ity under §59-5-46, and therefore, the main base of 
Points I and I I in the Attorney General's brief, must 
fall since it focuses on a few words rather than the law 
in its context. The Attorney General has erred in 
ignoring the plain-spoken purpose and policy of Chap-
ter Five. Judge Learned Hand once said, 
"There is no more likely way to misapprehend 
the meaning of language—be it in a constitu-
tion, a statute, a will or a contract—than to read 
the words literally, forgetting the object which 
the document as a whole is meant to secure." 
Central Hanover Bank <§ Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d CA 1947). 
It would be hard to find a better case to illustrate this 
perceptive observation. In sum, an attempt is made 
to derive an over-arching expansion of regulatory pow-
er from the "literal" meaning of this section deeply 
buried in the property tax assessment chapter. 
One final point should be made. The Attorney 
General's construction of a general regulatory power 
for the Tax Commission under U.C.A. §59-5-46 (1953) 
is completely at odds with the clear intent of the Leg-
islature only to make specific grants of regulatory 
power, section by section, with respect to the corpor-
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ation franchise tax. See the discussion under P O I N T 
IV. 
(C) Regulation 13 Can Apply only to Tax-
payers which File Utah Consolidated Returns. 
(1) The A ttempt to Apply Regulation 
13 to These Taxpayers Must Fail if it is 
Grounded Upon U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3). 
Following the lead of the Utah Constitution, the 
Utah Legislature has not given broad grants of regu-
latory power to the Tax Commission. Where the Leg-
islature has felt that regulation is necessary, it has made 
very specific grants of regulatory power. This can best 
be illustrated by U.C.A. § 59-13-7 (1953), which is the 
section containing the federal income tax deduction. 
That section has various subsections, each of which 
deals with a different deduction. In § 59-13-7, the 
Legislature gives the Tax Commission authority to 
promulgate rules and regulations with respect to some 
deductions, but not others. For example, Subsection 
10 of that section, dealing with the deduction of future 
expense liabilities as a result of a casual sale of real 
property, directs the Tax Commission to prescribe reg-
ulations pertaining thereto. The subsection provides: 
There shall be allowed as a deduction: 
In the case of a casual sale or other casual 
disposition of real property, a reasonable allow-
ance for future expense liabilities incurred under 
the provisions of the contract under which such 
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sale or other disposition was made, under such 
regulations as the tax commission may prescribe. 
U.C.A. § 59-13-7(10) (1953). "(Emphasis 
added) 
In addition, the Legislature directs the Tax Commis-
sion under U.C.A. § 59-13-7(8) (1953) to prescribe 
rules and regulations with respect to depletion deduc-
tions. These subsections contrast with the "taxes paid" 
deduction of U.C.A. § 59-13-7(3) (1953), which 
makes no mention of any authority given to the Tax 
Commission with respect to the prescription of rules 
and regulations for the deduction of "taxes paid." 
I t is evident from these illustrations that where the 
Legislature desires regulation by the Tax Commission, 
it makes a specific grant of authority. Without such 
authority the Tax Commission has no power to make 
law by regulation. If a need for regulatory authority 
in this area is found to exist, the proper forum for the 
executive branch is in the Legislature. 
(2) The Attempt to Apply Regulation 
13 to these Taxpayers Must Fail if 
Grounded on U.C.A. $59-13-23. 
(a) For Regulation 13 to be Valid, it 
Must Have Been Promulgated by the 
Taw Commission under Authority Grant-
ed in U.C.A. §59-13-23 (2) (1953). 
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As discussed above, the Tax Commission does not 
have a general power to promulgate Regulation 13, nor 
does it have authority under U.C.A. §59-5-46 1953). 
Whatever power the Tax Commission has for the prom-
ulgation of Regulation 13 must come from U.C.A. §59-
13-23(2) (1953).8 
Utah Code Annotated §59-13-23 (1953) deals with 
the filing of Utah consolidated returns. Subsection (2) 
of that section provides that: 
"(2) The tax commission shall prescribe such 
regulations as it may deem necessary in order 
that the tax liability of an affiliated group of 
banks and/or corporations M A K I N G A CON-
S O L I D A T E D R E T U R N and of each corpor-
ation in the group, both during and after the 
period of affiliation, may be determined, com-
puted, assessed, collected and adjusted in such 
manner as clearly to reflect the income and to 
prevent avoidance of tax liability." (Emphasis 
added). 
The Attorney General, in his brief at p. 10, tries 
to extend the application of regulations promulgated 
under the authority of U.C.A. §59-13-23(2) (1953) to 
all "affiliated groups" (whether or not they file Utah 
consolidated returns). This is an incorrect interpreta-
tion of that subsection. 
As discussed in Point III and Point IV D, there is no authority 
for Regulation 13 inherent in §59-13-17 and no other section 
has been cited as authority for Regulation 13. 
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Section 59-13-23 is entitled "Consolidated Re-
turns." Each subsection of that section deals with some 
aspect of the "privilege" of filing a Utah consolidated 
return. The very language of the subsection says that 
it applies to ". . . corporations making a consolidated 
return . . . " If a corporation does not file a Utah con-
solidated return the section does not apply to it. 
The Attorney General's argument to expand the 
Utah consolidated return statute to cover taxpayers 
who do not file a Utah consolidated return, must be 
restated (with emphasis supplied), to appreciate the 
point upon which it relies: 
"The statute authorizes the Tax Commission 
to prescribe such regulations for 'of each corpor-
ation in the group, both during and after the 
period of affiliation . . . .' Certainly, after the 
period of affiliation, a corporation would not be 
filing a consolidated Utah income tax return; 
hence, the above subsection (2) reaches all situ-
ations dealing with an affiliated group of corp-
orations, as defined.9 
The Attorney General misinterprets the meaning of 
this sentence by taking it out of context. 
Franchise Tax Regulation 4, §4.9, makes a sub-
sidiary which was part of an affiliated group, but is not 
now "affiliated", liable for any deficiency against the 
affiliated group for a period during which a consoli-
dated return was filed, if such return included the sub-
9 Tax Commission's Brief at p. 10. 
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sidiary. This liability remains even after the subsid-
iary is no longer a member of the affiliated group. I t 
is this situation which the sentence relied on by the 
Attorney General was intended to cover. 
The Attorney General, on p. 10 of his brief, states 
that the taxpayers "make no contention that they are 
not a member of an affiliated group as defined in the 
above-cited statutes". This point is irrelevant. Section 
59-13-23, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 
do not rely for their application on the "affiliation" of 
corporations. Rather, an "affiliated group" must elect 
to file a Utah consolidated return before this section is 
operative. "Affiliation" has significance only in that 
corporations must be "affiliated" to file a consolidated 
return. The taxpayers did not file a Utah consolidated 
return, and are, therefore, not bound by the regulations 
promulgated under authority of §59-13-23. 
(b) The Kennecott Case Ties the 
Validity of Regulation 13 to the Filing 
of a State Consolidated Return under 
U.C.A. §59-13-23 (2) (1953). 
The Attorney General argues that the Utah Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Reg-
ulation 13 in the Kennecott case. The Attorney General 
concludes from the Kennecott case that the Tax Com-
mission has blanket authority to apply Regulation 13 to 
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any Utah corporate taxpayer.10 The portion of the 
opinion which the Attorney General so construes reads: 
Kennecott further contends that the Commis-
sion erred in its allocation of deductible federal 
income tax to the Utah affiliated group. This 
matter was handled in accordance with the regu-
lation of the Commission rather than federal 
regulations. Kennecott was bound by the reg-
ulations of the Commission and we perceive no 
error in its application. Kennecott Copper Corp. 
v. State Tax Commission, 27 U.2d 119, 125, 493 
P.2d632 (1972). 
There is an important factual difference between 
the Kennecott case and this case: Kennecott filed a 
Utah consolidated return. The taxpayers in this case 
filed a federal consolidated return, but their Utah re-
turns were filed separately. The language of the Court 
in Kennecott specifically mentioned that the allocation 
was to be made to the Utah affiliated group (a ref-
erence to the fact that the deduction in question was 
taken on a Utah consolidated return). The Court fur-
ther pointed out that Kennecott was bound by the reg-
ulations of the Tax Commission. This was a reference 
to U.C.A. § 59-13-23(1) (1953) which makes the filing 
of a Utah consolidated return conditional on the accept-
ance of regulations which deal with state consolidated 
returns. Kennecott had, therefore, accepted Regulation 
13. 
io See, Conclusion of Law No. 3 in the Tax Commission's decision 
in The Matter of Midland Telephone, Decision No. 288. 
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The Tax Commission emphasized the importance 
of Kennecott's consent in their Conclusions of Law 
from the Kennecott hearing before the Tax Commis-
sion. The Tax Commission's Kennecott decision con-
tained 25 Conclusions of Law. Of those 25 Conclusions 
of Law, only one dealt with the question of the deduct-
ibility of federal taxes. That conclusion was Conclu-
sion of Law No. 14: 
Kennecott accepted and is bound by Commis-
sion regulations governing the filing of consoli-
dated returns, including Regulation 4 and Reg-
ulation 13 and,, therefore, the action of Kenne-
cott in claiming a deduction for Federal Taxes 
pursuant to Treasury Regulation 1.1502-33 (d) 
(2) is improper.11 
The Tax Commission disposed of Kennecott's entire 
"taxes paid" argument with the statement that Kenne-
cott was bound by Regulation 13 since Kennecott had 
consented to its application. 
The importance of consent to the consolidated re-
turn regulation was again emphasized by the Attorney 
General in his appeal brief to the Utah Supreme Court 
in Kennecott: 
Tax Commission Regulation 4(4) (b), condi-
tions the Tax Commission's acceptance of a con-
solidated return upon the filing by the affiliated 
group of a Form 22, wherein the group consents 
ii Regulation 4 deals with who may file Utah consolidated re-
turns, etc., and is not an issue here. 
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to the application of Utah Regulations as 
adopted. (See the Tax Commission's Brief, 
supra at 55.) 
Although it cited the regulation rather than the con-
trolling statute (§ 59-13-23(1)), the Attorney Gener-
al's point was that Kennecott had no room to argue 
that Regulation 13 did not apply to it since Kennecott 
had specifically consented to Regulation 13's applica-
tion by filing a Utah consolidated return. This is re-
iterated at page 57 of the Attorney General's Kenne-
cott brief: 
Thus, it appears that Kennecott in filing a 
consolidated return in the State of Utah has 
agreed to be bound by the Commission Regula-
tions governing the filing of such consolidated 
returns, including but not limited to Regulation 
13. Under the provisions of Regulation 13, no 
Federal tax can be assigned to loss items and 
Federal Regulation 1.1502-33(d) (2) has no ap-
plicability. 
The Attorney General cites Kennecott for the 
proposition that Regulation 13 has general application 
to all Utah corporate taxpayers.12 However, the ma-
terial quoted supra from page 125 of the Kennecott 
opinion is the only material in the opinion which deals 
with the question of the deductibility of the federal in-
come taxes paid by Kennecott's federal consolidated 
group, and even then the Court merely held that Kenne-
V2 Tax Commission's brief at p. 18. 
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cott was bound by that regulation since it filed a Utah 
consolidated return. I t did not deal with the general 
application of Regulation 13 to separate return tax-
payers. 
(c) Midland and Utah Telephone Did 
Not File a Utah Consolidated Return 
and are not Bound by the Tax Commis-
sions Utah Consolidated Return Regu-
lations, including Regulation 13. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-13-23(1) (1953) pro-
vides in pertinent part that: 
The making of a consolidated return shall be 
upon the condition that all the corporations 
which have been members of the affiliated group 
at any time during the taxable year for which 
the return is made consent to all the regulations 
under subsection (2) of this section prescribed 
prior to the making of such return; and the mak-
ing of a consolidated return shall be considered 
as such consent. (Emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-13-23(1) (1953) by its 
terms limits application of regulations promulgated 
under authority granted by subsection (2) to those 
corporations which file Utah consolidated returns, and 
thereby consent to such subsection (2) regulations. 
The taxpayers do not file and have never filed Utah 
consolidated returns. Midland and Utah Telephone 
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file their state returns on a separate basis. Since they 
do not file Utah consolidated returns, they are not 
subject to the provisions of U.C.A. § 59-13-23 (1953). 
Consequently, they did not and could not consent to 
the Tax Commission's regulations dealing with Utah 
consolidated returns. They did not and could not give 
the Form 22 consent obtained from Kennecott by the 
Tax Commission. Since Regulation 13 was promul-
gated under authority granted the Tax Commission by 
the Legislature to deal with Utah consolidated returns 
and requires consent for its application, it did not and 
could not apply to either taxpayer in this case. 
(D) The Attempt to Apply Regulation 13 
to These Taxpayers Must Fail if Grounded on 
U.C.A. § 59-13-17 (1953). 
There is no grant of regulatory power in § 59-13-
17. That section only applies, as the Attorney General 
admits on p. 14 of his brief, when the Tax Commission 
has found that a properly determined tax grounded on 
another statute is being evaded. 
P O I N T V 
R E G U L A T I O N 13, I F V A L I D , CANNOT, 
BY I T S OWN T E R M S , A P P L Y TO T H E 
P R E S E N T CASE. 
(A) Introduction. 
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There are only two subsections of Regulation 13 
which may under any construction apply to the tax-
payers. The first is Regulation 13, § 13.3. That sub-
section is entitled "Accrual Basis Taxpayer". The sec-
ond possibly applicable section is Regulation 13, § 13.4, 
entitled "Assignment of Federal Incomes Taxes". As 
will be pointed out in more detail below, neither of 
these subsections applies in this particular case. 
(B) Section 13.3 of Regulation 13 is Merely 
an Accounting Method Definition. 
Subsection 13.3(a) is the pertinent part of § 13.3. 
That subsection provides: 
"In the case of an accrual basis taxpayer, the 
amount of federal income tax to be allowed as a 
deduction in arriving at the total corporate net 
income for Utah franchise tax purposes is norm-
ally limited to the amount of the actual federal 
income tax liability in connection with its federal 
return for the same period. 
The Attorney General, for purposes of this case, con-
strues this subsection to mean that taxpayers' federal 
tax deduction is limited to their computation of the pro-
portionate share of the total federal consolidated tax 
actually paid over by taxpayer's shareholder corpora-
tion. 
However, the Attorney General's present construc-
tion is clearly at odds with the original meaning of sub-
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section 13.3(a). The subsection was meant to be an 
instruction to an accrual basis (as opposed to cash 
basis) taxpayer as to the method it must employ in 
determining the timing of its federal tax deduction for 
any particular year. The issue dealt with in subsection 
13.3(a) is whether the federal tax deduction is limited 
to the amount of federal taxes due on the net income 
of the taxpayer for the applicable year, or whether the 
taxpayer may also deduct taxes assessed for previous 
years which it pays in the present year or which come 
to a final determination through litigation or adminis-
trative procedure in the present year. 
The purpose of subsection 13.3(a) is made clear 
by the other subsections under § 13.3. Since, as ex-
plained above, under subsection 13.3(a), the accrual 
basis taxpayer may not deduct, in a current year, taxes 
which are paid in that current year, but on net income 
from prior years, subsection 13.3(b) provides that the 
taxes accruing for the prior years must be taken by 
filing amended returns for those prior years rather than 
deducting the amount currently. 
Consider the following illustration: 
A corporation is an accural basis taxpayer. I t 
has paid federal income taxes since 1960. In 
1975, the IRS assesses a deficiency of $10,000 
for 1972. In 1975, A pays the $10,000 deficiency 
and accrues a federal tax liability of $50,000 for 
its 1975 taxable income. Under Regulation 13, 
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A may only deduct $50,000 on its 1975 return 
even though it accrued $60,000 in taxes that year. 
I t must deduct the other $10,000 by amending its 
1972 return. 
As the subsections illustrate, the intent of subsec-
tion 13.3 (a) was to instruct the corporate taxpayer that 
it could deduct currently only those federal taxes which 
are based on current net income. I t has nothing to do 
with the problem before this Court. 
This conclusion is bolstered when the Court con-
siders the addition made to subsection 13.3(a) of Reg-
ulation 13 effective for tax years beginning after Janu-
ary 1, 1973. The amendment was made by the Tax 
Commission following the Kennecott case, which was 
the first court case to question Regulation 13. The 
1973 addition to Regulation 13.3 (a) provides: 
In case the corporation was included in a 
consolidated return for federal income tax pur-
poses, the amount of federal income tax to be 
allowed as a deduction in arriving at the net 
income of the corporation shall be limited to its 
proportionate share of the actual federal income 
tax due with the federal consolidated return for 
the same period. The proration of the allowable 
federal tax must be made only to profit-produc-
ing corporations included in the consolidated re-
turn. 
The intendment of the language in this addition is 
quite clear. Without any reference to new legislation, 
it attempts to expand Regulation 13 to deal with sep-
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arate corporations which file federal consolidated re-
turns. Even if this bootstrap amendment were found 
to be controlling, it affects only tax years beginning 
after January 1, 1973. As the Attorney General states 
in his brief at p. 16: 
"The [present] Corporation Franchise Tax 
Regulation No. 13 . . . is not the regulation in 
effect under the present fact situation during the 
taxable years in question and should be disre-
garded. (AB-Appendix) (See Exhibit 17) In 
particular, the second paragraph in Section 13.3 
(a) is not found in the Regulation 13 applicable 
to this situation." (Emphasis added) 
The Attorney General has made taxpayers' case 
—the very computation which the Tax Commission 
seeks to impose upon the taxpayers (§ 13.3(a), second 
paragraph) is unot the regulation in effect under the 
present fact situation" and "in particular, the second 
paragraph in Section 13.3(a) is not found in the Regu-
lation 13 applicable to this situation." 
The Tax Commission cannot have it both ways. 
Either the 1973 amendment to Regulation 13 is valid 
and does not apply in the years in question to these tax-
payers or it was redundant and totally unnecessary. 
A more reasonable premise is that, following the 
Kennecott challenge, the Tax Commission realized that 
Regulation 13, as it existed prior to January 1, 1973, 
could not cover corporations filing consolidated federal 
returns and separate Utah returns. 
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I t should not go unnoticed that the Attorney Gen-
eral has failed to respond adequately to the above argu-
ment in its brief at p. 16. Certainly, totally unsup-
ported (see Tax Commission's brief at p. 16) conclu-
sionary statements are not sufficient. The Attorney 
General's complete response to the above argument is 
as follows : 
"Appellant's argument . . . in this matter, is un-
tenable. This argument is irrelevant and bears 
similarity to the 'subsequent repairs' reason for 
nonadmissibility of evidence under the Utah 
Rules of Evidence 51." 13 
The "similarity" suggested by the Attorney General 
does not explain in any way why taxpayers' argument 
is "untenable" or "irrelevant". Rule 51 is, of course, a 
policy decision to encourage "subsequent repairs." 
(C) Section 13.4 of Regulation 13 is an Al-
location Provision which Does Not Apply to 
the Taxpayers. 
The only other part of Regulation 13 which the 
Attorney General now construes to apply to Midland 
and Utah Telephone is § 13.4. The pertinent portion 
of § 13.4 of Regulation 13 provides as follows: 
"An assignment of a portion of the total al-
lowable federal income tax deduction on the 
13 Tax Commission's brief at p. 16. 
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Utah corporation franchise tax return may be 
required for certain purposes . . . Corporation 
Franchise Tax Regulation No. 13, § 13.4(a). 
(Emphasis added) 
This section contemplates a situation where the "total 
allowable federal income tax deduction" has already 
been determined. In such a case, this section then pro-
vides a means by which the liability is allocated be-
tween income allocable to Utah and income derived 
from activities outside of Utah. The section does not, 
contrary to the contention of the Attorney General, 
purport to determine the amount of the "total allowable 
federal income tax deduction". 
This construction of subsection 13.4(a) is made 
even clearer by subsection 13.4(c) and the addition to 
subsection 13.3(a). Subsection 13.4(c) is an amplifica-
tion of subsection 13.4(a), and provides that "federal 
income tax assignments are to be made to profit-pro-
ducing items or divisions only." The plain meaning of 
"items or divisions" is that the entities receiving the 
assignments are all part of the same corporation rather 
than corporate subsidiaries of the same parent corpor-
ation. If the section had been intended to apply to 
subsidiary corporations such as Midland and Utah Tele-
phone, it would have used the word "corporations" 
rather than "items or divisions". This construction can 
be illustrated by the addition to subsection 13.3(a) 
effective after January 1, 1973. That addition clearly 
was intended to apply to subsidiary corporations filing 
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federal consolidated returns. The addition to subsec-
tion 13.3(a) refers to "profit-producing corporations/' 
The conclusion follows, that when the Tax Commission 
in its regulation intends that application be made to 
subsidiary corporations, it clearly states that intention. 
The following is an example of how subsection 13.4 
was intended to work: 
X has subsidiaries A and B. A, is a Utah 
corporation with divisions doing business in and 
out of Utah. B, a California corporation, does 
business only in that state. The X group files 
a federal consolidated return. 
The amount of federal tax liability allocated 
to A is the "total allowable federal income tax 
deduction" of A. That amount is not determined 
under subsection 13.4(a), which assumes the 
amount of the total deduction has already been 
determined, but rather it is computed under stat-
ute and generally accepted methods of account-
ing. Once the amount of "total allowable fed-
eral income tax deduction" is determined for A, 
subsection 13.4 (a) requires that a portion of that 
total deduction be allocated to Utah income and 
a portion be allocated to non-Utah income. 
Subsection 13.4(a) is not intended to deter-
mine how the total consolidated tax is to be 
divided between A and B, which are separate 
corporations. 
In our case, the Court must determine the tax-
payers' "total allowable federal income tax deduction". 
This is not covered by subsection 13.4(a) which only 
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covers the allocation A must make between Utah and 
non-Utah income. The taxpayers' income allocation is 
not in dispute here. Therefore, the taxpayers' share 
of the total Continental deduction is not brought into 
issue by subsection 13.4 (a). 
The Attorney General in his brief at p. 16 also 
cites subsection 13.4(b) of Regulation 13 as authority 
for its present position. Such a construction is incon-
sistent both with the language of subsection 13.4(b), 
and with the general purpose of § 13.4 as set out above. 
Subsection 13.4(b) speaks in terms of "assigning" 
federal income taxes to "segments of net income sub-
ject to federal income tax. . . ." The term "segments 
of net income" is consistent with the example above. 
That term deals with intracompany assignments. I t 
was not meant to be used for assignments between sep-
arate corporations. If the latter had been the intent 
of the subsection, it would have used a phrase such 
as "subsidiary's net income." Subsection 13.4(b) just 
does not apply to the taxpayers since there is no dis-
pute as to whether they properly allocated any tax 
deduction between Utah and non-Utah income. 
P O I N T VI 
R E V E N U E R A I S I N G P O L I C Y CONSID-
E R A T I O N S MUST BE L E F T S O L E L Y TO 
T H E U T A H L E G I S L A T U R E . 
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The Attorney General has attempted to prejudice 
the consideration of the legal merits of this case by in-
troducing two categories of non-legal revenue "policy" 
considerations which the Court should reject.14 The 
first attempts to make the obvious sound dangerous— 
that the Tax Commission will collect less revenue than 
it seeks if it loses this case. The second category is a 
mistaken version of the federal tax law and its impact 
on Utah revenues, and is highlighted by such phrases 
as: "subsidize the elimination of intercompany profits"; 
"Legislature should set the guidelines if affiliated com-
panies are to get tax relief"; "reduction of the fran-
chising fee necessarily discriminates against intrastate 
domestic corporations"; "federal tax loopholes"; "ties 
the State of Utah to everchanging federal tax regula-
tions." 
The Attorney General points out in its "Policy" 
No. 1 that if the Tax Commission loses this case it will 
be deprived of the additional revenues it seeks. This is, 
of course, implicit in any case involving the Tax Com-
mission and is not relevant to a correct application of 
the law. In any case, the increase would be fleeting 
because of the stifling effect on competition and future 
growth created by such discriminatory applications of 
the tax laws. 
The second category results from the Attorney 
General's misunderstanding of the federal tax law. In 
14 Tax Commission's brief at pp. 23-24. 
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summary, the taxpayers determine their "taxes paid" 
deduction based on their Utah net income just as any 
other Utah corporation. They then pay this amount to 
Continental, their agent for payment of federal taxes, 
just as any other Utah corporation would pay it to the 
Internal Revenue Service. The taxpayers ask only for 
the same deduction they would be entitled to if they 
did not file a federal consolidated return. They do not 
seek an advantage over any other Utah corporation. 
The Attorney General misunderstands these basic 
facts. There will be no reduction of the franchising fee 
if the taxpayers win this case. Rather, the taxpayers' 
franchising fee will be an identical percentage of their 
taxable Utah income as is any other Utah corporation's. 
The federal regulations which the Attorney General 
refers to as impinging on Utah revenues have nothing 
to do with the determination of the franchise tax. Those 
federal regulations only affect the taxpayers' "earnings 
and profits" — which is a concept entirely distinct from 
taxable income and has nothing to do with any tax the 
corporations pay. 
Amicus Curiae would like to point out the real 
impact of this case if the Tax Commission prevails — 
the franchising fee will be increased for the taxpayers 
and all other Utah corporations filing federal consoli-
dated returns. The Tax Commission is attempting to 
punish these Utah corporations, regulated in all re-
spects by Utah and serving Utah consumers, for filing 
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federal consolidated returns. Without some expression 
to the contrary, the intention to exact the penalty here 
sought by the Tax Commission should not be attributed 
to the Utah Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
The State Tax Commission's decision denying a 
full "taxes paid" deduction to Midland Telephone 
Company and Utah Telephone Company should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D O N A L D B. HOLBROOK, 
M E R R I L L R. W E E C H , and 
L A R R Y C. H O L M A N of 
J O N E S , W A L D O , H O L -
BROOK & M C D O N O U G H 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Amieus-Curiae 
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APPENDIX 
EXHIBIT "A" 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 6B 
TITLE 59 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Chapter 1. Tax on Tangible Property, 59-1-1. 
2. Exemptions, 59-2-1 to 59-2-3, 59-2-5 to 59-2-13, 59-2-17 to 59-
2-31 [59-2-4, 59-2-14 to 59-2-16 Repealed]. 
3. Definitions, 59-3-1. 
4. Situs, 59-4-1, 59-4-2. 
5. Assessment of Property, 59-5-1 to 59-5-19, 59-5-21 to 59-5-46, 
59-5-47 to 59-5-67, 59-5-67.2 to 59-5-81, 59-5-83 to 59-5-111 
[59-5-20, 59-5-46.1, 59-5-67.1, 59-5-82 Repealed]. 
6. Apportionment, 59-6-1 to 59-6-3. 
7. Equalization, 59-7-1 to 59-7-15. 
8. County Auditors' Duties, 59-8-1 to 59-8-10. 
9. Levies, 59-9-1 to 59-9-5, 59-9-6.1 to 59-9-13 [59-9-6 Repealed]. 
10. Collection of Taxes, 59-10-1 to 59-10-72. 
11. Miscellaneous Provisions, 59-11-1 to 59-11-15 [59-11-16 Re-
pealed]. 
12. Inheritance Tax, 59-12-1 to 59-12-37, 59-12-39, 59-12-40, 59-12-
42 to 59-12-44 [59-12-38, 59-12-41 Repealed]. 
13. Franchise and Privilege Taxes, 59-13-1, 59-13-3 to 59-13-19, 59-
13-22 to 59-13-97 [59-13-2, 59-13-20, 59-13-21 Repealed]. 
14. Individual Income Tax, 59-14-1 to 59-14-72 [59-14-73 to 59-14-
80 Repealed]. 
14A. Individual Income Tax Act of 1973. 59-14A-1 to 59-14A-98. 
15. Sales Tax, 59-15-1 to 59-15-4, 59-15-4.6 to 59-15-22 [59-15-4.5 
Repealed]. 
36. Use Tax, 59-16-1 to 59-16-3, 59-16-3.6 to 59-16-22, 59-16-24, 59-
16-25 [59-16-3.5, 59-16-23 Repealed]. 
17. Chain Store License, [59-17-1 to 59-17-9 Repealed]. 
18. Tobacco Licenses, 59-18-1 to 59-18-4, 59-18-5 to 59-18-15, 59-
18-17 to 59-18-19 [59-18-4.1, 59-18-16 Repealed]. 
19. State Tax System Committee, 59-19-1 to 59-19-7. 
20. Uniform System of Accounts, 59-20-1 to 59-20-3. 
21. Oleomargariue Excise Tax, [59-21-1 to 59-21-25 Repealed]. 
22. Multistate Tax Compact, 59-22-1 to 59-22-9. 
23. Charitable Trusts, 59-23-1 to 59-23-13. 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY 59-5-1 
Collateral References. 
Taxation<3=>98. 
84 C.J.8. Taxation §§ 339 to 348. 
Place for taxation of danr 
rights, or water power, 64 A. L. R. 143, 
CHAPTER 5 
ASSESSMENT OP PROPERTY 
ARTICLE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS, 59-5-1 to 59-5-3.5. 
2. ASSESSMENT BY COUNTY ASSESSOR, 59-5-4 to 59-5-18. 
3. ASSESSMENT OF TRANSIENT LIVESTOCK AND HONEYBEES, 59-5-10 to 59-5-29. 
4. DUTIES or COUNTY ASSESSOR, 59-5-30 to 59-5-36. 
5. STATE TAX COMMISSION, 59-5-37 to 59-5-51. 
6. ASSESSMENT BY STATE TAX COMMISSION, 59-5-52 to 59-5-65. 
7. MINING OCCUPATION TAX, 59-5-66 to 59-5-85. 
8. FARMLAND ASSESSMENT ACT OF 1969, 59-5-86 to 59-5-105. 
9. ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT, 59-5-106 to 59-5-111. 
ARTICLE 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property. 
59-5-2. Assessment by county assessor—Basis of property taxation for county 
and subdivisions!. 
59-5-3. Assessment by state tax commission—Properties assessed by, enumer-
ated. 
59-5-3.5. Prorata application of ad valorem tax on property taken by eminent 
domain or by right of entry agreement. 
59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property.—All taxable property, not spe-
cifically exempt under Article XIII, section 2, of the Constitution of Utah, 
must be assessed at thirty per cent of its reasonable fair cash value. Land 
and the improvements thereon must be separately assessed. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2506; 
C. L. 1917, §5866; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
80-5-1; L. 1947, ch. 102, § 1 ; 1961, ch. 142, 
§1 . 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1947 amendment substituted "forty 
per cent of its reasonable fair cash value" 
for "at its full cash value." 
The 1961 amendment inserted "not spe-
cifically exempt under Article XIII , sec-
tion 2, of the Constitution of Utah" and 
substituted "thir ty per cent" for "forty 
per cent." 
Administration of act. 
The state tax commission administers 
this act. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State 
Tax Comm., 327 U. S. 573, 90 L. Ed. 862, 
«'i> S. Ct. 745, affirming 150 F. 2d 905. 
Building restrictions and easements. 
To assess property without regard to a 
'"lilding restriction or an easement would 
'•o to assess it without regard to the nature 
'ii<l extent of the property interest which 
the assessed owner has in the land, in com-
plete disregard of its fair cash value which 
would be in violation of this section. 
Haves v. Gibbs. 110 U. 54, 169 P . 2d 781, 
163* A. L. R. 513. 
Burden of proof. 
Burden to show inequality of assessment 
was on taxpayer. First Nat. Bank v. Chri-
stensen, 39 U. 56S, 118 P. 778. 
Coal lands. 
A blanket assessment of all coal lands 
in county could not be made at a flat or 
uniform rate. Ririe v. Randolph, 51 U. 
274, 169 P . 941. 
Deductions. 
Value of stock of corporation doing 
business in state cannot be diminished, for 
purposes of taxation, by deducting from 
it value of property not situated or taxable 
in state. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Cham-
bers, 21 U. 324, 61 P. 560, affd. 182 U. S. 
556, 45 L. Ed. 1227, 21 S. Ct. 863. 
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This matter came on for hearing before the State 
Board of Tax Review on December 13, 1973. Present 
at the hearing on behalf of the Appellant was Wilham 
D. Griffin, State and Local Tax Manager, Massey-
Ferguson, Inc. Present on behalf of the Department 
of Revenue were Harry M. Griger, Assistant Attorney 
General, and Vernon Raile, Supervisor, Corporation 
Audit Section. The State Board of Tax Review con-
sisting of Louis I. Nussbaum, Chairman, Edwin A. 
Hicklin and Keith A. McKinley, Members, upon con-
iii 
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sideration of the notice of appeal from the order of the 
Director, the answer filed, having heard all evidence 
and arguments, does hereby make the following: 
F I N D I N G S O F F A C T 
1. That the State Board of Tax Review has juris-
diction of the parties and of the subject matter herein. 
2. That the Appellant appealed from the order of 
the Director of Revenue dated June 15, 1973, which 
order denies Appellant's claim for refund of corpor-
ation income tax in the amount of $7,510.00 for the 
fiscal year ending October 31, 1969. 
3. That the facts are summarized in the Director's 
order of June 15, 1973, and were not in dispute at 
the hearing before this Board. 
CONCLUSIONS OF L A W 
Under the provisions of Section 422.35(4), Code 
of Iowa, a corporation may deduct 50 per cent of the 
federal income taxes "paid or accrued" by the corpor-
ation during the taxable year. 
In this case the Appellant accrued total federal 
income taxes in the amount of $1,833,021.00 arising out 
of profits from its operation during the fiscal year in 
iv 
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question. Had the Appellant filed a separate federal 
corporate tax return, this would have been its tax liabil-
ity. I t did not, however, file a separate return but 
rather filed a consolidated return with other subsidiaries 
of Massey-Ferguson, Inc. Due to offsetting losses by 
other subsidiaries the over-all effect was that the con-
solidated federal corporate return produced no income 
tax. And as a matter of fact there was a refund of 
estimated tax paid. 
As between the Appellant and Massey-Ferguson, 
Inc., there was an intercompany transaction in which 
the Appellant paid to the parent company the amount 
of its tax liability and the same was credited to surplus 
by the parent company. 
This Board adopts the position that in filing a 
separate state corporate tax return the Appellant is 
entitled to claim 50 per cent of the federal income tax 
which is "accrued" by that corporation in determining 
its state tax liability under the provisions of Section 
422.35(4). 
In support of this position the Board favorably 
considers the language of the Supreme Court of Kansas 
in the case of Cities Service Gas Company v. McDon-
ald, 466 P2nd 277. In this case the Court is consider-
ing a factual situation much like the one at hand and 
a Kansas statute similar to our own statute. 
Inasmuch as this matter can be disposed of through 
V 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the interpretation of the above referenced section, the 
Board need not consider nor pass on the question con-
cerning the filing of a consolidated state corporate tax 
return. 
I T IS T H E R E F O R E O R D E R E D by the 
State Board of Tax Review, Mr. Nussbaum and Mr. 
McKinley concurring and Mr. Hicklin dissenting, that 
the Director's order in upholding the Department of 
Revenue's assessment against Appellant be reversed, 
that the assessment against the Appellant be cancelled, 
and that Director be ordered to refund to the Appel-
lant the sum of $7,510.00, plus interest as may be re-
quired by Statute. 
Done at Des Monies, Iowa, this 8th day of July, 
1974. 
I O W A S T A T E BOARD O F 
T A X R E V I E W 
By / s / Louis L. Nussbaum 
Louis L. Nussbaum, Chairman 
By / s / Keith A. McKinley 
Keith A. McKinley 
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